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Many papers on gender inequality focus on one or more respects in which 
women, as a group, fare worse than men, with some also noting respects in 
which gender discrimination and oppression is bad not only for women and 
children but also, as John Stuart Mill recognized, for society as a whole 
(1869: eg. 471-5, 558, 564). All this is, of course, consistent with men being 
harmed by patriarchal institutions or worse off than women in some respects 
either because of those institutions or for independent reasons.
In his controversial paper “Four Puzzles on Gender Inequality,” based 
on a provocative talk presented at a feminist forum, Philippe Van Parijs lists 
some peculiar gender inequalities. Such inequalities are puzzling not because 
they indicate dimensions in which women fare better than men but because 
they show a lack of shared and clear criteria to determine when inequality 
involves injustice, which is not due to predictable differences between Left 
and Right. Whether some inequalities require some sort of compensation or 
institutional reform is unclear even within a single position in distributive 
justice, including positions as elaborated as that of John Rawls. 
As readers will notice, the paper is different from the standard scholarly 
pieces that appear in academic journals like LEAP. However, it still serves 
a valuable philosophical function because the puzzles it describes raise 
important questions regarding which statistical differences between two 
social groups identify an injustice and which merely contain information 
that is either irrelevant or that bears a more indirect relation to social 
justice. The value of discussing these questions, stressed by Van Parijs’ 
response “Real Freedom for All Women (and Men),” thus extends well beyond 
feminism. In addition, each instance of gender inequality Van Parijs describes 
is also intriguing in its own right, and not only as an illustration of the 
general problem just described. So, the discussion published here aims to 
contribute to an exchange that is informative and engaging not only for 
those interested in gender but also for those working on distributive justice 
more generally.
1. I thank Philippe Van Parijs and all participants for their cooperation and contributions 
and Serena Olsaretti for useful comments on this introduction. For help with the entire 
exchange, I thank Andrew Williams for excellent philosophical advice, and Laura Sánchez 
de la Sierra and Hannah Weber for their conscientious editorial assistance.
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The first potential injustice Van Parijs’ paper discusses concerns the 
fact that women live longer than men. This issue, previously discussed 
not only by conservatives like John Kekes (1997: 100ff) and men’s rights 
advocates like David Benatar (2012: 57ff), but also by luck egalitarians like 
Shlomi Segall (2010: 105ff), brings out the controversy over whether there 
are normative differences between natural and social inequalities. The 
authors who successively agreed to contribute a piece on this puzzle turned 
out to be unable to deliver it. And so, despite the fact that LEAP Editors do 
not normally contribute to any exchanges, I ended up writing a (doubly 
blind refereed) reply to this first puzzle not to delay publication further. 
The response, “Distributive Justice and Longevity,” claims that on plausible 
liberal egalitarian views men’s lack of female longevity is not an injustice.
The second potential injustice concerns women’s greater educational 
achievements. This new trend is worth attending to inter alia because 
women’s lower educational achievements used to be deemed an important 
cause of gender inequality (e.g. Okin 1989: Ch. 7, esp. 142-7). In “Women’s 
Greater Educational Efforts as a Consequence of Inequality,” Jesús Mora 
denies there is any injustice here because society does not offer men any 
less educational opportunities. Instead, men reject or squander their equal 
or greater educational opportunities because society already offers them 
such good opportunities that they do not need qualifications as desperately 
as women, who, by contrast, in view of their greater likelihood of suffering 
domestic and workplace exploitation, take up the opportunities they have 
more conscientiously.
A third puzzle highlighted by Van Parijs concerns the fact that most 
voters are women, both because women live longer and because educated 
individuals tend to vote more. In “Do Women Enjoy a Political Advantage?” 
Pierre-Étienne Vandamme denies this inequality is an injustice or even an 
advantage because mere membership in a majority group cannot plausibly 
be judged so. Moreover, if women are not voting self-servingly, it is 
inappropriate to respond to their discharging their duty to vote and 
protect public goods or vulnerable groups, like children or animals, by 
depriving them of resources we otherwise deem theirs.
A fourth and final puzzle arises from three distinct inequalities, which 
may or may not represent injustices: inequalities in the possession of certain 
hormones, in incarceration rates, and in sexual desire. In fact, the final puzzle 
actually contains three distinct puzzles, which is why there are three responses 
to it. “Hormonal inequality” is the claim that men are handicapped by 
possessing more hormones linked to undesirable behaviors such as those 
involving imprudence or aggression. In “A Blatant Case of Over-Accommodation,” 
Valeria Ottonelli grants that the set of propensities Van Parijs describes as 
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linked to male hormones could, in some sense, be understood as disabilities. 
But she argues that the over-accommodation of the unfortunate traits has 
effectively turned them into advantages. One cannot thus claim hormonal 
inequality is an injustice that needs to be rectified or that diminishes the 
inequality between men and women.
Inequalities in incarceration rates are a very different matter. First, 
incarceration is something only a minority of men experience, rather than 
part of men’s normal constitution, like male hormones. Second, incarceration 
is not something that happens “naturally” but is instead a social method to 
prevent a murderer or rapist from committing further crimes and to deter 
other individuals from acting likewise. Third, unlike hormones, incarceration 
rates bring back the debate between natural and social inequalities and 
causation. Van Parijs compares the higher incarceration rates suffered by 
men with those suffered by the victims of social injustice, poverty and 
racial discrimination, despite the fact that it is women that are more often 
the victims of social injustice, poverty, and discrimination. However, in 
“Are Unequal Incarceration Rates Unjust to Men?” Gina Schouten answers 
affirmatively, even if men are the beneficiaries of injustice and guilty of the 
crimes for which they have been imprisoned.
A final issue involves the fact that men tend to be more interested in sex 
than women, and hire prostitutes or act foolishly, harming themselves and 
others in the pursuit of sexual gratification. In “The Rich Also Cry,” Ana de 
Miguel not only addresses the issue of prostitution and male desire. In 
addition, she also tries, to some extent like Vandamme, to explain why Van 
Parijs’ original audience reacted with hostility to his talk. 
One reason for the adverse reaction seems to be the way Van Parijs’ 
comments on prostitution sit outside decades of feminist work on the fact 
that almost all clients of prostitutes– including child prostitutes – are male, 
and how the sex industry and much of society caters to male desires for sex 
and domination that men do not regret. 2 Van Parijs, of course, does not 
claim that since men have certain desires women should give in to men’s 
demands. However, at least part of the hostile reaction appears to have been 
caused by his unawareness of the way, vividly illustrated by de Miguel, in 
which portraying male sexual “greediness” as a burden men bear can be 
used, and has been used, for oppressive purposes.
2. For example, since men want novelty and ethnic variety, pimps regularly relocate 
prostitutes, preventing them from forming attachments that can undermine the pimp`s 
control (de Miguel 2015:165). In the wider society, too, sexual access to women is maximized 
by keeping them poor, voiceless, isolated, homebound, or foot-bound, in harems or brothels, 
and by inventing religions like that of trokosi, deukis, and devadasi that sanctify sexual slavery, 
or by brainwashing girls into “wifely duties” and obedience because “men can’t help it.”
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Van Parijs was moved by the desire to understand distributive justice 
better and was not thinking about possible misuses of his questions nor 
about the existence of a men’s right movement, with which he has no 
connection. However, as women’s position slowly improves in developed 
societies, and men’s rights groups grow and become more vocal academically, 
legally, and politically, these sorts of misencounters and heated reactions 
are only likely to multiply and escalate. It is, therefore, preferable to examine 
calmly and separately each claim about a potential injustice to men. Some 
disputes may be solved by mere exposure to the relevant empirical research 
and by clarifying misunderstandings or faulty patterns of reasoning, whilst 
others may involve reasonable disagreements, or refer to an important 
unfairness to men that needs to be institutionally addressed. In all cases, 
however, it seems preferable to discuss such matters amicably when one 
has well-disposed interlocutors eager to do so, than to ignore potentially 
reasonable considerations. Failing to discuss such concerns is likely to fuel 
the growing resentment that is already brewing in the men’s rights movement.
Some general recommendations one can extract from the exchange between 
Van Parijs and the other six political philosophers who respond to him are 
also likely to prevent other inequalities from being misconstrued as injustices. 
The first is that we should not zoom in and focus on an isolated inequality, 
for example, on education or longevity, without also zooming out to take a 
wider picture that may change the significance of the observed inequalities. 
The second is that we should not assume all statistical regularities indicate 
the existence of constraints reducing individuals’ options, responsibility, or 
liabilities. For example, the fact that there is a strong statistical correlation 
between excessive power and corruption does not mean that power reduces 
people’s options and should be seen as an attenuating circumstance making 
the powerful less liable to punishment for corruption. Finally, we cannot 
assume inequalities are reduced whenever the better-off engage in unadvisable 
behavior. For example, we may have reasons not to count the badness of 
being corrupt as something that diminishes the inequality between the 
very powerful and the powerless. 3
3. One example can illustrate all three points. It was statistically very normal for slave-
owners to pick a slave and force her to satisfy whatever sexual whim they had. The way the slave’s 
family looked at the slave-owner doing so or perhaps the expression of the slave-owners’ wife or 
daughter if they saw him may have caused him a temporary discomfort. However, it would seem 
odd to focus on that discomfort as an inequality justice requires amending, once we zoom out 
and take into account the circumstances that surround the discomfort and explain it. Second, 
the fact that it was common for slave-owners to exploit slaves sexually does not automatically 
mean slave-owners were constrained or lacked sufficient opportunity to act differently. Finally, it 
would be strange to deem the slave-driver’s greater tendency towards additional wrong doing 
as something that reduced the inequality between masters and slaves.
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The following exchange discusses several inequalities seen both from a 
narrower and a wider focus by Van Parijs and his commentators, reflecting 
on relevant factors that surround each of them. After all, it is by placing all 
the pieces together rather than by staring at each one in isolation that 
puzzles are usually solved.
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